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Abstract.12This paper argues that at a certain point in research 
toward AGI, the problem may become well-enough theorized that a 
clear roadmap exists for achieving it, such that a Manhattan Project-
like effort could greatly shorten the time to completion. If state 
actors perceive that this threshold has been crossed, their incentives 
around openness and international cooperation may shift rather 
suddenly, with serious implications for AI risks and the stability of 
international AI governance regimes. The paper characterizes how 
such a ‘runway’ period would be qualitatively different from 
preceding stages of AI research, and accordingly proposes a research 
program aimed at assessing how close the field of AI is to such a 
threshold—that is, it calls for the formulation of a ‘roadmap to the 
roadmap.’ 
1 RUNWAY TOWARD AGI 
A large proportion of AI researchers expect that artificial 
intelligence capable of outperforming humans in many or all tasks 
will be within reach within  four or five decades [24,48]. While the 
literature at times makes slight distinctions between ‘high-level 
machine intelligence’ [24], ‘human-level AI’ [45], or ‘strong AI’ 
[39], the most common term for capturing most of these concepts is 
‘artificial general intelligence’ (AGI) [21]. In essence, AGI denotes 
broad and flexible AI systems that are at least at human level in 
every cognitive domain [4]. 
AGI is closely related to the concept of ‘superintelligence’—AI 
that greatly surpasses the best humans at every cognitive task [4]—
for two reasons. First, a human-level AI would also at least have all 
the advantages computers already have. For example, thanks to fast 
data processing and vast memory, an AI capable of comprehending 
even high school-level English could memorize all the knowledge 
on Wikipedia with trivial ease. Thus, AGI would inherently be 
superhuman in many or most areas. Second, it is often projected that 
AGI could quickly become superintelligent through a process of 
recursive self-improvement sometimes known as an ‘intelligence 
explosion’ [4,15,22,40]. For these reasons, the goal of achieving 
AGI entails far greater potential capabilities than “mere” human-
level intelligence. 
Already today, several dozen R&D projects worldwide are 
actively pursuing AGI [3]. Scholars have observed that the 
enormous benefits of human-level AI, possibly including “radically 
transformative” [25] impact would be comparable to the Industrial 
Revolution [36]. The economic, scientific, and military advantages 
conferred by such a breakthrough, along with the prospect of 
unlocking an intelligence explosion, could mean geopolitical 
dominance for the first nation state with access to AGI. This 
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possibility may motivate an international “arms race” toward this 
technology [2,4,27]. That potential dynamic has serious implications 
from the perspective of technical safety [1,17,59] as well as in the 
context of governance and policy [11,13,50,68].  
These strategic considerations have fostered analogies to the 
development of nuclear weapons [42,55]. Some observers have 
compared the state of AI research to nuclear physics in the 1930s 
[23], with the suggestion that a massive Manhattan Project-style 
engineering effort could allow one well-resourced actor to achieve 
AGI much sooner than rivals expect.  
Critics of this comparison have correctly highlighted differences 
between the open culture of contemporary AI research and the 
coordinated and covert nature of wartime nuclear weapons 
development [55]. Further, there is good reason to believe that the 
state of basic research on AGI is currently much more immature than 
the state of nuclear physics just prior to the Manhattan Project [26]. 
But these disanalogies need not remain true forever.  
As the scientific roadmap becomes clearer, as it did for nuclear 
weapons by 1942, a ‘runway’ toward AGI may come into focus—
where the key theoretical breakthroughs have been made, and the 
remaining research questions are well enough formulated to bring 
human-level AI within reach of a massively funded engineering 
project. While this is not a certainty, the plausibility of such 
conditions occurring calls for better understanding of how such a 
runway might be detected and what its implications could be. 
 
 
1.1 Defining a ‘runway sprint’ project 
In considering the scale of resources that might be applied once a 
runway to AGI appears, two historical examples stand out: the 
Manhattan Project and the Apollo program. In both cases, a 
powerful state actor perceived a technological opportunity of 
paramount strategic importance, and at peak devoted about 0.4% of 
GDP toward greatly accelerating progress toward it. Scaled as a 
percentage of current U.S. GDP, that amounts to something like an 
annual budget of $80 billion in today’s dollars [61]. 
These examples stand in stark contrast to other scientific 
megaprojects undertaken when the strategic stakes are much lower. 
The Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory (LIGO) 
cost less than $33 million a year over 19 years of development [6]. 
The Human Genome Project took 13 years and spent the equivalent 
of $400 million a year in today’s dollars [49]. The Large Hadron 
Collider (LHC) at CERN took about 10 years to build, at an average 
cost of about $475 million per year [7,38]—though full operational 
costs are in excess of $1 billion per year [56]. Finally, the ITER 
fusion reactor is projected to average just under $2 billion per year 
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during 12 years of construction [18].3  Moreover, rather than single-
country projects, the costs of these programs have each been shared 
among several countries.  
While these efforts are arguably comparable to the atomic bomb 
or the moon landing from a purely engineering standpoint, none of 
them had similar geopolitical urgency. And although LIGO, the 
LHC, and ITER all received substantial international public funding, 
they were not fundamentally outside the capacity of non-state 
actors—costing much less than the largest private-sector R&D 
budgets, such as those of Amazon and Alphabet [14]. 
So from the limited sample of historical precedents, it appears 
plausible that AGI—if its implications are properly understood by 
policymakers—could motivate investment more similar to the quest 
for nuclear weapons than to the effort to detect gravitational waves.4 
Indeed, current military spending evinces governments’ willingness 
to pour enormous resources into projects when there is a perceived 
strategic imperative. The F-35 stealth fighter program, for example, 
is projected to cost the United States around $16 billion annually 
over its 60-year lifespan [20].5 This aircraft, while an evolutionary 
improvement over its predecessors, offers nowhere near the 
revolutionary defense advantages that AGI would bring to numerous 
fields from cyberwarfare to autonomous weapons [19,54,55]. 
There is no bright-line definition of what would constitute a 
Manhattan Project-level AGI effort, but very roughly we might 
consider this a program with resources 1-2 orders of magnitude 
greater than existing projects. This would be effectively beyond the 
means of the private sector, and only be plausible for several of the 
world’s wealthiest state actors. Such a project would be intended to 
‘sprint’ down an apparent runway to artificial general intelligence 
within a relatively small number of years,6 likely under perceived 
strategic pressure. While the Manhattan Project involved physical 
sequestration of top scientists at a remote government research 
facility, an AGI sprint project need not take this particular form. It 
could involve clandestine support of private sector actors, and 
because computing does not require as much concentrated 
infrastructure as do physics experiments, its activities could be 
highly distributed geographically. Rather, the essential similarities 
to the Manhattan Project would be massive funding and strategic 
urgency. 
1.2 Runway sprints and surface area 
Whether a runway sprint succeeds likely depends partly on when it 
is initiated. The U.S. government could have devoted not 0.4% but 
4.0% or 40% of its GDP to exploring “military applications of 
nuclear physics” in 1932, yet probably not have achieved a working 
bomb by 1935. The key reason is that the basic science was still too 
immature, and the problem had not yet been broken down into a 
roadmapped series of sub-problems (e.g. enrichment, isotope 
separation, metallurgy, explosive lenses [30]) to which engineering 
                                                                
3 Even the most expensive single object in history, the International Space 
Station, cost about $11-15 billion per year over 10 years [16]—well below 
the GDP-scaled costs of the Manhattan Project and Apollo program. This is 
unsurprising, since the ISS had much lower strategic importance.  
4 There have been some abortive attempts at moonshot-style AI 
megaprojects before. DARPA’s 1983-1993 Strategic Computing Initiative 
in the United States spent about $100 million a year in pursuit of what we 
would now call AGI [58]. But the SCI was undertaken with a very 
primitive understanding of what AGI would entail, and DARPA effectively 
misjudged that it was on the runway. Something similar may well happen in 
the future. But the fact that states may incorrectly believe themselves to be 
on the AGI runway does not imply that eventually one of them won’t be 
correct. Even if 10 runway sprints are ultimately attempted, 9 are premature 
and only 1 succeeds, this scenario will have been worth taking seriously. 
effort could be applied. Regardless of a state actor’s willingness to 
commit resources, it was simply not clear in 1932 how to allocate 
them.  
This highlights the more general idea that problems in science 
and technology have a ‘surface area’ [12], which characterizes how 
readily divisible they are for researchers and resources to bring 
simultaneous efforts to bear in solving them. Recalling the truism 
that 9 women cannot gestate a baby in 1 month, problems with small 
surface area may require a sequence of abstract theoretical 
breakthroughs by the very top thinkers in a field. Simply throwing 
large numbers of PhDs at the problem likely will not overcome those 
causal dependencies and allow a quick breakthrough. 
By contrast, problems with larger surface area have well-defined 
and roadmapped sub-problems that can be worked on in parallel. 
Under those conditions, greatly increasing the resources devoted to 
the problem can rapidly accelerate progress. In other words, as 
surface area expands, it is easier to “buy progress” toward 
completion. Conceptually, then, AGI research would be on the 
runway and thus susceptible to a sprint project when advances in 
theory and basic research expand the surface area of the problem 
enough that a roughly Manhattan Project-size injection of resources 
could greatly accelerate the timeline and achieve success within 
several years.  
1.3 Surface area of AGI 
The surface area of the AGI problem can be understood as evolving 
along a continuum, from smallest to largest. In its initial state, before 
Alan Turing’s seminal 1950 paper “Computing Machinery and 
Intelligence,” [63], the field was essentially waiting for someone to 
come along and conceptualize artificial intelligence itself. At that 
stage, resource application was probably almost irrelevant to 
progress, as the problem itself wasn’t formulated yet. At the other 
end of the continuum is some hypothetical future point where all the 
scientific questions have been answered and success is purely a 
matter of resource application—perhaps physically constructing a 
certain piece of hardware, feeding in data, or even re-assigning 
sufficient pre-existing supercomputer or cloud computing capacity. 
As of 2020, it is unclear where the field stands between those two 
poles. It could be that there are many profound theoretical problems 
still to be solved [33,43]—perhaps some that we haven’t even dimly 
imagined yet. It is also possible that the surface area has already 
expanded enough that a sprint project begun now would likely 
succeed. While it isn’t possible to precisely measure the scientific 
surface area of AGI, as we argue in section 3.1, further research may 
be able to estimate when the runway has been reached. 
Indeed, this possibility of misjudgment underscores the need for better 
means of understanding the dynamics of the runway and assessing the 
field’s proximity to AGI [11]. 
5 For comparison, perhaps the most startling AI advance over the last year 
has been GPT-3, OpenAI’s powerful text-generating language model [5]. 
Training GPT-3 cost an estimated $12 million in compute [64,66]. That’s 
less than the cost of the missiles carried by one fully loaded F-35 and the 
helmet the pilot uses to aim them [46,47,65]. 
6 The meaning of “small number of years” is necessarily somewhat vague 
here, but might be loosely defined as shortening a decade-plus trajectory to 
within something like 3.5 years (Manhattan Project) or at most 8 years 
(Apollo program). 
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1.4 Three runway scenarios 
In assessing progress toward AGI with respect to the runway 
concept, we note three broad possibilities. In short: 1) there will be 
a runway period, but we are not in it yet; 2) there is a runway period, 
and we are in it already, or; 3) there will be no runway period, 
because the “last mile” of the AGI problem is not susceptible to 
large-scale engineering. After sketching each in further detail, we 
will argue why the first two likely occupy enough of the probability 
space to make further research into AGI runway conditions 
warranted. 
1.4.1     We’re approaching the runway 
The first possibility, and the one we consider most likely given the 
evidence, is that there will eventually come a moment when the 
surface area of the AGI problem has expanded enough to allow a 
successful runway sprint project, but that more basic research needs 
to happen first before we approach such a point. In this scenario, the 
impressive AI progress of the past decade does not imply that 
general intelligence can be attained by just scaling current 
techniques up. Rather, there might remain ‘computational 
primitives’ fundamental to human-level cognition that are yet to be 
discovered and theorized [44], or essential aspects of intelligence 
itself that remain deeply misunderstood. That does not mean that 
steady progress over the coming decades may not crack these 
problems. It simply means that no party today has the sort of 
engineerable roadmap to AGI that would constitute a runway. 
1.4.2 We’re already on the runway now 
The second possibility is that the relevant theoretical breakthroughs 
for AGI have already been made, even if this is not widely apparent 
or recognized yet. For example, it could be that Rich Sutton’s “Bitter 
Lesson” [62] is true, and that the computationally intensive 
“scaling” approach notably advanced by OpenAI will prove 
sufficient to achieve AGI [29,35]. According to this hypothesis, the 
main factor preventing a system like GPT-3 from achieving human-
level performance is simply that it does not yet have enough 
parameters. If so, then a reasonably straightforward process of 
adding orders of magnitude more parameters, training data, and 
compute7 would result in AGI—whether this would come at the 
level of GPT-5 or GPT-12.8 This would imply that we are already 
on the AGI runway as of 2020, which would suggest two main 
possibilities. The first is that state actors like the United States and 
China could achieve AGI substantially sooner than OpenAI itself 
can by applying their resources aggressively, but they have not 
recognized this opportunity. The second is that one or more such 
actors have recognized this opportunity and already commenced 
runway sprint efforts in secret. 
1.4.3                        There is no runway 
The third possibility is that there will be very substantial overhangs 
in hardware and software engineering, such that AGI is solved quite 
suddenly by one final, keystone theoretical breakthrough. We might 
imagine some discovery in another discipline, or some new 
                                                                
7 In this scenario, there would likely still be some theoretical challenges 
entailed in this scaling-up process. But they would be the sort of challenges 
that a large number of well-paid computer scientists could be confidently 
expected to eventually solve, rather than deeper fundamental issues whose 
ultimate tractability is substantially in doubt. 
algorithmic technique—which is nearly costless to implement—that 
quickly activates latent potential in systems that have already been 
designed or built. In this scenario, development toward AGI 
proceeds at something similar to current rates, with ever-improving 
capabilities, but no clear roadmap to AGI ever appears. Then, 
following some hard-to-predict single discovery in mathematics, 
cognitive neuroscience, or theoretical computer science, it becomes 
possible to use existing technology, or recombine existing 
approaches, in a new way that promptly enables AGI. In a case like 
this, the surface area of the problem never expands enough to make 
Manhattan Project-scale resources particularly useful.  
1.5 Assessing the probability space 
It is of course possible that no AGI runway will ever manifest. If not, 
this would be impossible to determine in advance—the counterproof 
would be the sudden appearance of AGI itself. But such a trajectory 
would be quite surprising. All the most comparable precedents—
Manhattan Project, Apollo program, LIGO, Human Genome 
Project, and LHC—were brought to fruition with large-scale 
engineering effort. There is no compelling reason to suspect a priori 
that AGI will be different.  
If there is some point at which AGI will fall within reach of a 
runway sprint, the remaining question is whether this has happened 
yet. Here, the behavior of relevant actors provides a fairly strong 
signal. Almost none of the top AI labs and researchers in the field 
have described AGI as fully theorized or purported to present a full 
engineering roadmap. Even OpenAI, the lab most closely associated 
with the scaling model, has avoided making strong public claims 
about whether present approaches can be scaled up all the way to 
AGI. 
Furthermore, no AI labs have secured even multibillion-dollar 
annual funding. This is significant because five major tech 
companies have R&D budgets over $10 billion a year: Amazon, 
Alphabet, Intel, Microsoft,9 and Apple. So if any research group 
could make a convincing case that AGI was within sprinting 
distance, it is reasonable to expect that deep pockets in Silicon 
Valley would at least be investing far more heavily than they 
currently are. 
Likewise, state actors do not appear to believe that the field has 
reached the AGI runway. There is no indication that anyone has 
already begun a sprint megaproject. Given the relatively open nature 
of the international AI research community [34,55], it would 
presumably have at least sparked persistent rumors if the U.S. or 
China had secretly committed to such an undertaking. Yet there 
seem to be no credible voices raising those suspicions.  
It is certainly conceivable that all these actors—including the 
world’s top AI experts and governments with an intense interest in 
achieving technological advantages over rivals—are overlooking 
present runway conditions. But the fact that they appear to be 
signaling a consensus with their choices is significant evidence 
about the information available to them and how they have analyzed 
it. The most parsimonious explanation is that this consensus holds 
because the surface area of the AGI problem has not yet expanded 
enough—that we have not yet reached the runway.  
Taken together, these factors suggest a very significant chance 
that either the first or second scenario holds. Since, as we describe 
8 As joked by Geoffrey Hinton in reaction to the GPT-3 announcement: 
“Extrapolating the spectacular performance of GPT3 into the future suggests 
that the answer to life, the universe and everything is just 4.398 trillion 
parameters” [31].    
9 In 2019, Microsoft did make a multi-year $1 billion investment in OpenAI 
[51]. 
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in section 2, the implications of reaching the AGI runway may be 
dramatic, there is good cause for a research program aimed at 
assessing how close such a runway may be. 
2 INCENTIVES ON THE RUNWAY 
As of 2020, AGI remains relatively poorly theorized. Not only have 
the key research questions not been solved, many of them have likely 
not even been formulated yet. We can speak of AGI in functional 
terms (what it could do) [21], but it remains broadly unclear what 
neurocomputational mechanisms are actually behind human general 
intelligence, or what engineering challenges would be entailed in 
emulating them digitally. With all this uncertainty, AGI has attracted 
only a small share of the mainstream attention now going to artificial 
intelligence as a looming geopolitical issue. 
While state actors like China [8] and the United States [52,53] 
have expressed long-term strategic interest in artificial intelligence, 
this is largely focused on below-human-level AI applications, and 
there is scant indication that either fears the other might achieve 
strategic surprise with AGI in the foreseeable future. Meanwhile, 
there is a burgeoning global movement encouraging responsible 
development around issues like ethics, bias, transparency, and 
autonomous weapons [3,9].  
In this climate, it is difficult for policymakers to see AGI as 
either an imminent threat or a decisive opportunity—and  
comparatively easy to support cooperative international AI 
governance regimes [9]. This is because the net incentives for 
cooperation are currently relatively good (e.g. favorable public 
relations, lessened competition), and the short-term rewards of 
defection are comparatively modest and non-decisive (e.g. better 
cyberwarfare tools), whereas the long-term rewards of defection, 
while large (AGI and “decisive strategic advantage” [4]), are far-off 
and uncertain. This may create a false sense of security in the AI 
governance community—the perception that if states can be 
convinced to avoid an all-out AI arms race in the near term, they will 
continue to hold back indefinitely.  
Yet if the viability of a runway sprint project depends chiefly on 
a few surface-area-expanding theoretical breakthroughs instead of 
smoothly-scaling inputs, we might instead see sudden and 
discontinuous incentive shifts. Historically, the prospect of 
disruptive new technologies can suddenly upend the strategic 
calculations of states, leading to an erosion or the functional 
obsolescence of existing governance regimes [10,41]. Likewise, the 
continued stability of any AI governance equilibrium may hinge on 
states repeatedly asking themselves the binary question: “can we (for 
any amount of funding) sprint down a runway to AGI?”—and 
answering in the negative.  
Once state actors realize that basic research has generated the 
roadmap of relatively engineerable sub-problems that would 
constitute a runway, that answer would flip from ‘no’ to ‘yes.’ When 
it thus appears that the geopolitically decisive advantages of AGI or 
superintelligence can be attained quickly by greatly scaling up 
investment, the classic one-off prisoner’s dilemma would take hold 
[60]. That is, not only will states be tempted by the rewards of 
achieving AGI first, they might reason “if we can sprint to AGI, so 
can the other side”—prompting an immediate preemptive sprint, 
even if there remains some uncertainty around whether AI science 
has in fact reached the AGI runway. 
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concrete and fleshed out, it would already be clear how close we are to the 
AGI runway. Devising a useful “roadmap to the roadmap” will likely require 
ongoing research collaboration between AGI theorists, managers of previous 
Thus, whether one is already concerned about an imminent “AI 
arms race” [28,37], believes that this risk is overblown [57,69], or is 
optimistic that such a race might be controlled [32,42], the 
emergence of AGI runway conditions would greatly exacerbate 
these dynamics, and introduce new sources of instability. Crucially, 
the incentives state actors would face while on the runway would 
push them toward all-out competition even if none of them would 
have independently sought AGI for offensive or hegemonic 
purposes. 
3 TOWARD A ROADMAP TO THE 
ROADMAP  
If one or more state actors suddenly undertake runway sprint 
projects toward AGI, the incentives to rush could compromise AI 
safety [2], and national security policies might shift in ways (e.g. 
changes to immigration, intellectual property, export controls) that 
disrupt ongoing research in the private sector and academia. Worse, 
if democratic regimes ignore signs that the field has entered the 
runway period, an authoritarian power might secretly undertake a 
successful sprint and achieve global dominance. In either case, these 
risks might be reduced by a broadly-shared set of metrics for 
assessing how close we are to the runway—that is, how close we are 
to an AGI roadmap that would enable a sprint.  
Measuring this progress could provide a ‘fire alarm’ for AGI 
[67]; it would help other stakeholders take appropriate precautions 
and potentially influence the incentives states face. A well-defined 
roadmap toward the AGI roadmap could also help democratic 
policymakers assess the likelihood that rival authoritarian regimes 
have secretly begun such projects—and could thereby motivate 
collaborative international efforts to prevent them from succeeding 
first. This consideration likely outweighs concern that such a meta-
roadmap could act as an information hazard. Better for everyone to 
be asking these questions openly than have state actors groping 
privately for answers amidst high uncertainty. 
3.1 Measuring surface area 
The fundamental question is: what needs to happen before the 
surface area of the AGI problem is large enough that a state actor’s 
runway sprint project could plausibly tackle the remaining steps 
within several years? Flowing from that: how can we assess the 
field’s progress toward crossing that threshold? This suggests need 
for further focused study of ‘runway’ conditions within AI 
assessment research. While such work will no doubt refine the 
relevant criteria, several broad classes of signals may provide 
promising insight about whether the surface area has expanded 
enough for there to be an engineerable roadmap.10 
3.1.1 Roadmapped sub-problems 
In order for vast resources to be able to scale up research impact, 
there has to be a well-articulated set of sub-problems which, if 
separately solved, would cumulatively result in AGI. Implicit in this 
is the need for a better-theorized understanding of what AGI itself 
would even entail: a research goal comparably clear to detonating an 
atomic bomb or landing a man on the moon. No roadmap will be 
perfect or free of uncertainty, but understanding the general path 
scientific megaprojects, and the sorts of policymakers who would be charged 
with actually evaluating whether an AGI roadmap is robust enough to justify 
a massive runway sprint project. This paper is merely intended to highlight 
promising areas for more extensive and systematic study. 
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dependencies makes a large-scale engineering project plausible. 
Thus, as the field gains increasing clarity about the key sub-
problems to AGI, it will be closer to the runway. 
3.1.2 AGI production function 
An actionable roadmap would provide clear estimates of the 
‘production function’ for AGI: “[t]o what extent does [AI] 
performance scale with training time, data, compute, or other 
fungible assets?” [11]. That is, it would empirically formalize the 
relationship of resource inputs to results or breakthroughs. A well-
theorized function would let a state actor make an evidence-based 
allocation  of  its  engineering  resources  between, for  example, 
hardware, algorithms, and data collection.  
3.1.3 Capital intensiveness 
Related to the above, progress toward AGI can be seen as requiring 
a combination of scientific talent to solve theoretical problems and 
the fungible resource investments characterized by the ‘production 
function.’ While resources like compute and basic hardware can be 
scaled up arbitrarily with the size of financial investment, human 
research discoveries are inherently more uncertain [67]. Hiring twice 
as many high-level PhD researchers does not cleanly scale to twice 
as many theoretical advances. Thus, to the extent that progress 
toward AGI depends on investments in hardware and software 
capital, the surface area is larger and a runway sprint project is closer 
to viability.  
3.1.4 Parallelism 
Ambitious research programs aiming at technologies like nuclear 
weapons or AGI will inevitably hit roadblocks. Problems not 
apparent at the outset will impede progress, and new approaches will 
be needed. Therefore, when there are several apparent parallel 
approaches to potential bottlenecks, the surface area is greater than 
when progress is highly dependent on one single speculative 
advance. This makes progress more robust to individual failures, and 
when more candidate approaches that can be attempted in parallel, 
large-scale resources can be brought to bear more efficiently. 
Roughly speaking, this translates to creating multiple research units 
to work on different sub-problems at the same time. By contrast, 
when known sub-problems must be tackled sequentially due to path 
dependencies, it is generally harder for investment to accelerate 
progress.  
3.1.5      Feedback speed 
The goal of a sprint project is to trade money for time—using 
enormous resources to accelerate progress. This is aided by an 
ability to test approaches quickly and iterate solutions based on the 
results. If certain sub-problems inherently take a long time to solve 
(e.g. requiring lengthy real-time training in the physical world), this 
bounds the speed with which the overall project can be completed. 
Conversely, approaches that provide prompt feedback allow faster 
exploration of the search space of possible solutions—and thus, 
more effective application of resources. 
                                                                
11  This is the same principle guiding our speculation in section 1.5 that 
scenario 2 (that we’re already on the AGI runway) is relatively unlikely. 
3.1.6 Behavior of key actors 
When AI safety and governance researchers attempt to assess how 
close the field is to the AGI runway, they will never have perfect 
information. Private-sector labs will keep proprietary details of their 
research closely guarded, and government-funded research may be 
classified. But the decisions and policies of those actors may provide 
indirect insight about the hidden information available to them.11 For 
example, if scientists at top labs concede that they wouldn’t know 
how to usefully spend a vastly larger budget, this is evidence that 
they don’t see the surface area expanding. On the other hand, if a lab 
suddenly starts seeking and attracting vastly greater funding, this 
likely signals that they have discovered ways to productively apply 
those funds—which would imply expanding surface area.  
 Likewise, if a government abruptly starts changing its policies 
around AI research in a more nationalistic direction, or pouring 
opaque funding into new private-sector partnerships, this may be 
evidence that it perceives the AGI runway to have been reached.  
Any tech company, investment firm, or state actor might be 
mistaken in its runway judgment. But to the extent those actors have 
established credibility and access to non-public information, unusual 
behavior changes should prompt the wider AGI community to ask 
“What do they know that we don’t?” 
4 CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we have argued that while the ‘surface area’ of the AGI 
problem may currently be too small for states to apply massive 
resources, it is plausible that their incentives will change sharply 
once basic research sufficiently expands this surface area. Due to the 
scientific and geopolitical implications of such a shift, there is need 
for better metrics for assessing how close AGI research is to being 
‘sprintable.’ As such, we have highlighted six broad elements of a 
roadmap that may approximate how the problem’s surface area is 
expanding. However, these are admittedly still rough, and we 
therefore propose further research to formalize and refine such 
metrics, as well as to identify other criteria and desiderata. Such 
work, we hope, could contribute to an actionable ‘roadmap to the 
roadmap.’ 
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